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Commonveil Adds a Sealed Post-Quantum Relay Between Sites

Commonveil's 0.22.0 repository change added a sealed, hybrid post-quantum layer to traffic exchanged between separately hosted sites.

By Comutability Published Update from

Project update: 12 November 2026. GitHub pull request #3: merged into GitHub source, not necessarily deployed. Commonveil has not been independently security audited.

Commonveil's 0.22.0 repository change added a sealed, hybrid post-quantum layer to traffic exchanged between separately hosted sites.

Why this matters

End-to-end encryption protects message content from a service provider, but ordinary site-to-site requests may still reveal sensitive communication patterns. This update aimed to narrow that gap by sealing requests and replies, binding the encryption to both sites and the endpoint, and refusing unsafe downgrades when keys are pinned. Independent review is still essential.

Detailed change record

The public engineering notes below describe what was implemented or proposed and the evidence recorded with the change. Historical instructions in the notes describe the pull request at the time it was raised.

What this changes

Requests one site sends another were protected only by TLS, so anything in between (the network, a CDN, a hosting platform's proxy, or someone recording traffic to decrypt later) could learn who is writing to whom and what was asked. Message content was already end-to-end encrypted and quantum-resistant; this does the same for the relay.

  • Sealed: request bodies are encrypted site to site with ephemeral P-256 ECDH and ML-KEM-768 together, then AES-256-GCM, bound to the two sites and the endpoint. Replies come back sealed under a one-time key from inside the request.
  • Signed twice: Ed25519 and ML-DSA-65 over the same signature base; both must verify.
  • No downgrade: relay keys are published in the site document (pq) and pinned with the site key. A site that has published them is refused if they change or vanish, and plain or singly-signed requests from it are refused.
  • Self-hosted and hosted sites both implement it. The algorithm code is Secure Net 0.3.1 (wire/sealed.js); the hosted functions use a generated verbatim copy, checked by npm run secure-net:check.

Needs a human reviewer

This is a security-sensitive protocol change prepared by an AI assistant. It should not be merged on its tests alone. Please review in particular:

  • the hybrid construction and key derivation in packages/secure-net/src/wire/sealed.js;
  • the pinning and no-downgrade rules in server/federation/net.mjs and base44/shared/federation/hosted.ts;
  • that the hosted site can load npm:@noble/post-quantum on the real platform (not yet tried there; if it can't, the site publishes no relay keys and refuses sites that require sealing).

Not changed, still classical: device signatures on messages, and private voting tokens.

Checks

npm run verify passes (231 tests, Secure Net's 31, type check, lint, both builds). The Docker image builds and serves its relay keys.

Decisions and principles behind the work

Comutability is building towards privacy, user control and genuinely self-hostable software. That does not mean every proposal is already deployed. Cryptography and security improvements need qualified human review and meaningful tests before any strong safety promises are made.

What comes next

Verify the feature on hosted and self-hosted deployments, assess metadata leakage and commission a qualified cryptographic review.

Check the sources

Sources and further reading

Explore the evidence and original project records behind this article.