Project update: 15 November 2026. GitHub change #5: merged into the repository. The underlying protocol remains draft and unaudited.
Secure Net's 0.6.0 code introduced a second-generation messaging session design, sealed sending and an MLS-based group profile.
Why we made this change
Encrypting a message body is only part of privacy. Headers, sender information, group membership and the movement of keys between devices also need deliberate designs. The proposal followed a desk review against Signal and Matrix, but its authors explicitly called for human cryptographic review before anyone relies on it.
The engineering record
The original pull request records the following technical scope and evidence. Some forward-looking notes in the record reflect the state of the work when the request was opened, rather than its status today.
Follows the desk review of Secure Net against Signal and Matrix. Stacked on #4 (which is stacked on #3): merge those first, or this PR's diff will include them.
Needs human cryptographic review before anything relies on it. See SNIP-0006.
What changes
CVP-016 version 2 (src/session/v2.js)
- The handshake transcript binds each prekey's public key, not only its id.
- The initiator's identity is encrypted in the first message.
- Headers are encrypted: no session tag, nothing links or orders messages.
- ML-KEM keys and ciphertexts travel in 256-byte pieces inside headers. An ordinary message is about 0.4 KB on average (was 3.1 KB).
- Keys for messages that haven't arrived are deleted after 7 days.
- Version 1 is still accepted and is deprecated. A device announces version 2 in its signed prekey; the client refuses to go back to version 1 with a device that has spoken version 2.
CVP-019 version 2 (src/social/)
- Version 2 direct envelopes (recipient device only).
- Unsigned direct activities, authenticated by the session, so a recipient can't prove what they were sent.
- Sealed sending: delivery tokens let a device hand envelopes straight to the recipient's site with no login, so neither site learns the sender.
- Group envelopes.
CVP-022 Groups (src/groups/, new)
- MLS (RFC 9420) through
ts-mls, suiteMLS_256_XWING_AES256GCM_SHA512_MLDSA87. - Credentials signed by Secure Net devices and checked on every leaf.
- One committer per group (leaf 0); commits from anyone else and all proposals are refused.
Trade-offs to weigh
- Version 2 mixes a new ML-KEM secret into the root key about once per 22 messages of back-and-forth; version 1 did it at every reply. X25519 still ratchets at every reply.
ts-mlsstates it has had no formal security audit. It is an optional peer dependency; its exact pins on noble are overridden to the versions Secure Net already uses.- MLS signs with ML-DSA-87 alone; credentials and posts keep hybrid signatures.
- A group stops changing while its committer is offline; handing the role over is not designed yet.
- Sealed sending doesn't hide the sender's network address, and unsigned messages can't be proved to a moderator.
Verification
npm test: 93 pass. New:test/session2.test.mjs,test/social2.test.mjs,test/groups.test.mjs.- Each of 22 new checks was removed in turn; 20 made a test fail. The two that didn't are redundant with another check (the header in the body's associated data; a key-id comparison beside a signature check) and are kept as defence in depth.
spec/vectors/cvp-016-v2.jsonandcvp-019-v2.json; the HKDF derivations and the token verifier were reproduced with Python'shmac/hashlib.node scripts/standards.mjs,vectors.mjs --check,manifest.mjs --check, and the three examples pass.npm ciworks from a clean checkout.
Not done
- No formal model, no independent review.
- Simultaneous session starts are still left to apps.
examples/two-party.mjsstill shows version 1.- Commonveil is not updated; that is a separate PR once this is reviewed.
The wider direction
The Comutability approach is open source with human accountability. AI can help research, design, write code and test it, but a merged change is not the same thing as an independently audited product. Secure Net is explicitly described as a draft in its public README. Its use in a sensitive situation should wait for qualified cryptographic review.
What happens next
Independent analysis of CVP-016 and the MLS profile is essential, particularly for downgrade resistance, group membership changes and cross-device recovery.

