Research record from 14 November 2026. This article discusses published project research and implementation evidence, not independent certification.
The Secure Net social research combined signed portable identities with private delivery, while documenting why it is not automatically interoperable with ActivityPub.
The gap between public federation and private conversation
The social-protocol proposal started with a difficult question: how could an independently hosted social network offer familiar posts, follows and communities while keeping private interactions unreadable to the sites transporting them? Existing decentralised protocols offer useful foundations, but their default public data models do not satisfy every privacy requirement.
SNIP-0005 considered ActivityPub's actor and activity vocabulary alongside AT Protocol's portable identity and signed repositories. Rather than silently changing either protocol, it proposed an additional Secure Net social layer built around device-owned keys and encrypted delivery.
Five specification parts
The proposal separates concerns into actors and discovery, activities, delivery, repositories and extensible lexicons. Actor documents carry handles, profile information, key histories and device references. Activities use recognisable names such as Create, Follow and Like while defining signed canonical records. Delivery distinguishes public messages from direct or audience-encrypted traffic.
Public activities may be recorded in verifiable repositories, while private content should not become plaintext merely because a server keeps a copy. Lexicons allow additional application-defined types with explicit authority and validation rules.
The portability problem
Moving away from a server requires more than changing the address in a profile. The proposed actor identity is tied to a cryptographic key and signed history so a new site can verify continuity. Signed repository commits also make public content independently checkable rather than dependent on one original database.
These mechanisms introduce questions about contact discovery, lost keys, moderation and delayed deliveries. A compromised device may backdate actions. A false address change may mislead someone before they verify an actor's key. Portability is therefore a security protocol, not simply an export button.
Why this is not ActivityPub compatibility
The specification states explicitly that its wire format is not directly interoperable with ActivityPub or AT Protocol. Public activities may admit a bridge, but private messaging has additional encryption and verification requirements. Advertising a bridge before implementing and testing one would create false expectations.
The social protocol also retains metadata limits: sites may observe delivery patterns and sizes. Private audiences need rekeying when someone leaves, and spam prevention becomes harder when site operators cannot inspect private content.
Implementation evidence and missing review
The research documents reference a social test suite, fixed vectors, a sample implementation and an example of multiple sites exchanging records. That is useful design evidence, not independent certification. Human cryptographic review was still unassigned in the original proposal, and adoption by Commonveil requires its own migration work.
The finding is that social interoperability, user portability and private content have to be designed together. A decentralised network can learn from existing protocols while being clear about which bridges have not been built.
Primary sources and further reading
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