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Self-Sovereign Identity: Passkeys, Keys and Recovery

What Commonveil's identity research found about separating account ownership from email, approving devices and recovering encryption keys.

By Comutability Published Update from

Research record from 6 November 2026. This is an evidence-led account of the research and design, not an announcement of independently audited software.

What Commonveil's identity research found about separating account ownership from email, approving devices and recovering encryption keys.

Identity is not the same as a login session

One of the project's core distinctions is between proving you may use a website account and proving you own the keys that protect your messages. Email can be a practical sign-in identifier, but it is not the same as cryptographic ownership. Commonveil's self-hosted identity design aims to let an account be owned by key material instead of by access to a third-party inbox.

The repository clearly distinguishes environments: the hosted Base44 service still uses Base44's email login in the documented version, while self-hosted sites implement email-free account ownership. Presenting these as one identical authentication system would be misleading.

What the proposed owner model uses

The self-hosted documentation describes a 24-word BIP-39 recovery phrase and an equivalent private-key representation. The owner key is derived locally; only its public half and challenge signatures are sent to the site. Challenge messages include the site and intended purpose so a valid proof for one action cannot be replayed as a different action.

Passkeys give a device-based way to sign in or confirm another device. Existing trusted devices can also authorise a new browser after the user compares a displayed code. If someone knows only a password, they should not automatically gain all historical encryption keys.

Recovery and revocation trade-offs

Strong self-sovereignty means the operator cannot quietly reset your message keys for you. It also means that losing every recovery method can permanently remove access. The design must say that plainly rather than promising a rescue route the software cannot safely provide.

The documentation describes a security epoch attached to sessions. Changing a password, recovering an account or disconnecting a device can invalidate existing sessions. The goal is to make revocation meaningful instead of leaving old access tokens valid until their normal expiry.

What was implemented and tested

The identity specification points to authentication and identity code, plus tests covering passkeys and software authenticators. Related security fixes addressed owner-key replacement, revoked access tokens and first-admin takeover. Those provide evidence of engineering work, but not of a flawless deployed experience on every browser.

The hosted and self-hosted identity implementations should be documented separately throughout the transition. Any future migration from email sign-in must preserve key ownership and avoid putting private recovery material into the service provider's hands.

What members should understand

Members need simple explanations for storing recovery phrases, recognising device-approval requests, using passkeys and responding to suspicious sign-ins. Making these flows accessible is essential: the security of the design depends on people understanding what they are authorising.

The next tests should include genuine recovery on a second device, revoked sessions, lost-passkey scenarios and readable instructions that do not accidentally encourage unsafe copies of secrets.

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Sources and further reading

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